10 lat EBC. Euro i zawiedzione nadzieje

1 czerwca minęło dziesięć lat od utworzenia Europejskiego Banku Centralnego, którego zadaniem jest wprowadzenie wspólnej waluty Euro we wszystkich krajach Unii Europejskiej. Pierwsza dekada EBC to okres zmarnowanych szans, rozbieżności inflacyjnych, spowolnienia gospodarki, spadku produkcji i zawiedzionych nadziei. W ostrych słowach na łamach „Financial Times” europejską walutę ocenia prezydent Czech, Vaclav Klaus.

In 1998 the eurozone was first of all a political project and it was generally believed that its economic underpinnings would be created at a later stage. A homogeneous economic entity was to be created, held together by a common currency.

These hopes have not been fulfilled so far. I am not surprised. European politicians expected the euro to speed up economic growth in Europe, which lagged behind the rest of the world, but the currency's adoption resulted in a further slowdown.

The eurozone has seen slower growth than the US and the European Union as a whole. Labour productivity growth has slowed and total factor productivity has dropped to a mere half of that in the two decades before the euro. It is clear that two groups of countries have emerged: one with a permanently high inflation rate; the other with a low one. From 2000 to 2006, inflation in six out of 12 eurozone countries exceeded the Maastricht criterion. A country with above-average inflation in a single exchange rate area gradually loses its competitive strength, and vice versa. Germany, for example, was pushed to a situation of deflation, which had a negative effect on its growth.

With the enlargement of the eurozone, inflation differences can become greater. In Slovenia, which entered the eurozone in January 2007, inflation rose from 1.6 per cent before accession to 5.7 per cent at the end of the first year of membership and to 6.9 per cent in March 2008. Today, it has the highest inflation rate in the eurozone. Experts agree that if Slovakia joins the eurozone it can also expect a significant rise in inflation.

These pressures also emerge in cases where a country has pegged its currency to the euro at a fixed rate. That is, to a great extent, why the inflation rates of the Baltic countries have reached 12 per cent to 17.5 per cent. This cannot be explained only by the rise in prices of food and raw materials.

Besides the euro, another reason for unsatisfactory growth is economic policy in the EU countries and a reluctance to carry out necessary liberalisation and pro-market reforms. On the 10th anniversary of the euro we hear the usual calls for greater fiscal discipline, for the perfection of the "stability and growth pact" and for decisive structural reforms. But these calls are not serious. They also ignore the fact that many of the eurozone's problems are caused by the introduction of a common currency in a disparate group of countries, each of which needs different interest and exchange rates.

Czeski prezydent pisze dalej o braku wizji europejskich polityków, których jedyną receptą na gospodarcze i polityczne wyzwania jest dalsza centralizacja oznaczająca odebranie państwom członkowskim możliwości zabiegania o własne interesy, po to aby Unia Europejska mogła mówić jednym głosem. Vaclav Klaus wskazuje też, że unijni biurokraci nie dostrzegają istotnych zmian sytuacji ekonomicznej na świecie, a naczelną kwestią, w którą są ślepo zapatrzeni jest globalne ocieplenie. Tymczasem tak istotne zjawiska jak wzrost znaczenia wielkich krajów jak Chiny, Indie, eskalacja światowej konkurencji na rynku surowców czy żywności są przez Unię Europejską ignorowane.

Cały tekst: http://tiny.pl/kcwl